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SMART CONTRACTS: LEGAL AGREEMENTS
FOR THE BLOCKCHAIN
REGGIE O’SHIELDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin, blockchain, and smart contracts—these are terms that
one hears with increasing frequency in the banking and financial press.
The blockchain technology underlying the digital currency Bitcoin is
widely touted to solve a number of seemingly intractable and
longstanding problems, such as reducing transaction costs, speeding up
processing time, expanding financial services, and empowering
consumers.1 Smart contracts are envisioned as potentially eliminating
the need for extrinsic enforcement of legal agreements, thereby making
business transactions cheaper, quicker, and more efficient.2 The World
* Reggie O’Shields is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Home
Loan Bank of Atlanta. He wishes to thank Andy Locker, Jon Parness, and Larry Wall for
their helpful comments on this paper, but retains sole responsibility for any errors or
omissions. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. O’Shields and not those of
the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta or its officers, directors, or employees.
1. DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 17–20
(2016). Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system using a digital or cryptocurrency,
which is not created or controlled by a governmental entity. Id. at 5. Bitcoin was developed
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Id. Its popularity has tended to rise with concerns
about government control and manipulation of the monetary supply. Id. For example, when
India’s government removed 86% of the nation’s money supply from circulation on
November 8, 2016, without notice, and Venezuela announced it was eliminating the
country’s largest circulating bank note. See, e.g., The Dire Consequences of India’s
Demonetisation Initiative, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21711035-withdrawing-86-value-cash-circulation-india-wasbad-idea-badly?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/; Anatoly Kurmanaev & Kejal Vyas, Currency Ban
Racks Venezuelans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2016, at A8. Bitcoin prices in late 2016 reached
three-year highs. Hudson Lockett, Bitcoin Price Rises to 2014 High as Chinese Stocks
Suffer, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c27e8345-a763-3761-adb69e5f44e4f5f6.
2. Not-So-Clever Contracts, THE ECONOMIST (July
30, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-stillbetter-bet-cold-hearted. The use of blockchain technology and smart contracts was also
cited approvingly in the 2016 Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”). FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 127 (2016). FSOC,
however, also noted potential risks including operational incidents, collusive fraud, and the
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Economic Forum has speculated that smart contracts utilizing
blockchain technology could codify financial agreements in a shared
platform and guarantee execution.3 This would significantly reduce the
manual effort required to support the execution of financial agreements
and thereby accelerate business processes.4 Other commentators have
suggested that if blockchain will allow financial transactions without
banks, smart contracts may lead to contracts that no longer need courts
to enforce them.5
Blockchain and smart contracts have led to many lofty goals and
predictions, but how realistic are these aspirations? Not everyone thinks
they are realistic, and have suggested that smart contracts are neither
smart, nor true contracts.6 If smart contracts are going to become
important business tools, additional legal and regulatory frameworks
may be necessary to mitigate any negative impacts and facilitate full
achievement of their potential. While there is certainly great promise in
these emerging technologies, they have also demonstrated potential
technological and legal pitfalls.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II examines the
origins of smart contracts and blockchain, or distributed ledger,
technology and how they work.7 Part III explores in greater detail
potential uses of this new technology as well as technical limitations or
barriers.8 Part IV describes the legal and regulatory issues associated
with greater adoption of smart contracts.9 Finally, the Conclusion
recommends legal changes that should be enacted in order to realize the
benefits of this technology sooner while also mitigating against its
potential risks.10

need for regulatory coordination across borders. Id.
3. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE: AN
AMBITIOUS LOOK AT HOW BLOCKCHAIN CAN RESHAPE FINANCIAL SERVICES 29 (2016).
4. Id.
5. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer
Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 39 (2014), http://
scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss2/3/ (“If financial transactions can be
freed of banks as intermediaries, then contracts can be freed of courts as intermediaries.”).
6. Daniel Cawrey, Why Ethereum Needs ‘Dumb’ Contracts, COINDESK (June 29,
2016, 6:50 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-dao-dumb-smart-contracts/.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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II. SMART CONTRACTS AND BLOCKCHAIN
Smart contracts are self-executing electronic instructions drafted
in computer code.11 This allows a computer to “read” the contract and,
in many cases, effectuate the instruction—hence the “smartness” of the
contract.12 The term was first developed by Nick Szabo in the mid1990s.13 Variations of smart contracts, such as transaction processing
systems that compute daily payments and receipts for financial
institutions, have existed for decades.14 The concept has taken on new
relevancy and possibilities, however, with the advent of Bitcoin and its
underlying technology called blockchain.15 Blockchain technology
provides the security and accuracy needed for a platform to be able to
more fully utilize smart contracts.16
Smart contracts self-execute the stipulations of an agreement
when predetermined conditions are triggered.17 The parties “sign” the
smart contract using cryptographic security and deploy it to a
distributed ledger, or blockchain.18 When the conditions in the code are
met, the program triggers the required action. For example, once a good
or service has been delivered, the smart contract could enforce payment
through the distributed ledger. In the event of nonpayment, it could
initiate recovery of the good or suspension of the service. This
technology has a large and expanding number of potential uses, such as
trading in financial instruments, syndicated lending transactions, and
securities settlement.19
Blockchain is the technology underlying the cryptocurrency, or
electronic money, Bitcoin.20 Bitcoin was launched in 2008 by an
11. SAMUEL BOURQUE & SARA FUNG LING TSUI, A LAWYER’S INTRODUCTION TO SMART
CONTRACTS 4 (2014).
12. Id.
13. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 101.
14. Allan I. Mendelowitz & Willi Brammertz, Smart Contracts Were Around Long
Before Cryptocurrency, AM. BANKER (Nov. 17, 2016).
15. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 102.
16. INST. OF INT’L FIN., GETTING SMART: CONTRACTS ON THE BLOCKCHAIN 2 (2016).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 3, at 39–40 (describing the various functions
that distributed ledger technology can perform within the financial system, benefits that can
be achieved, and conditions and implications of implementation).
20. John Lanchester, When Bitcoin Grows Up, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 21,
2016), https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n08/john-lanchester/when-bitcoin-grows-up.
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unknown person calling himself or herself, Satoshi Nakamoto.21 While
the popularity of Bitcoin as a medium of payment has ebbed and flowed
over the years, much of the recent focus, particularly in the banking and
financial space, has been on its enabling technology—blockchain.
Blockchain is a register, or ledger, of all bitcoin transactions that
have ever occurred.22 Each transaction, or block, is authenticated by a
network of computers before it is added to the chain of all prior
transactions using cryptographic techniques and a large amount of
computing power.23 The blockchain, or distributed ledger, is open and
transparent for all to see, although addresses shown do not necessarily
indicate the person to whom the address is associated, as the system is
also designed to be anonymous.24 The record is intended to be
permanent and immutable.25 The combination of attributes in this
technology—secure, permanent and immutable—has attracted the
attention of the largest banks in the world as well as financial startups.26
Blockchain uses encryption and a combination of public and
private “keys” for security.27 The system utilizes mathematical
techniques to match a public address with a private security access key
for each participant in a transaction.28 If these two items match, the
transaction is broadcast to the other participants in the blockchain for
verification and entry into the ledger.29 Bitcoin utilizes this “proof of
work” methodology for security purposes, but other techniques exist for
making sure transactions are valid and not duplicated.30 It has been

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 7.
See, e.g., Lucinda Shen, Blockchain Will Be Used By 15% of Big Banks By 2017,
FORTUNE.COM (Sept. 28, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/09/28/blockchain-banks2017/.
27. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6.
28. Lanchester, supra note 20.
29. Lanchester, supra note 20.
30. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31. Under the proof-of-work protocol, to
verify that transactions are legitimate and not fraudulent takes a lot of effort, or work, from a
distributed network of participants due to the complexity of the security protocol.
TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31. Participants in the Bitcoin Network, called
miners, have to expend resources in the form of computer hardware and electricity to solve a
mathematical puzzle to find the correct unique identifier for a block of transactions before
the new block of transactions can be verified and thus added to the list of all prior
transactions, i.e., the blockchain. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31. Once the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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suggested that blockchain involves two innovations—the ability to track
ownership and transfers of property without need of a trusted
intermediary and the ability to transfer property directly from peer to
peer.31
Smart contracts are intended to work in concert with blockchain
technology to enforce transactions on the blockchain. Smart contracts
are a step beyond typical electronic contracts in that the actual
agreement is embodied in computer code, rather than English or another
traditional language.32 In many other ways, however, smart contracts
are not novel, in that they must consist of a discernible agreement
between parties with capacity to make that agreement.33 In addition,
financial institutions have been using automated computer protocols to
settle transactions without human intervention for several decades.34
III. TECHNOLOGICAL AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPEDIMENTS
There is no shortage of potential uses for blockchain, or
distributed ledger technology, and smart contracts. The World
Economic Forum has suggested that they could be used in enhancing
global payments, syndicated credit, collateral management, proxy
voting, securities issuance, and regulatory and compliance activities.35
For example, syndicates of lenders could be formed using smart
contracts, and smart contracts could perform funding and servicing
activities for the syndicates.36 Central banks are exploring issuing

unique identifier is discovered, it is relatively easy for other participants in the network to
verify its accuracy. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31. The miners who discover
the unique identifiers receive bitcoins as the reward for their work. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT,
supra note 1, at 31. Other methods for verifying transactions for posting on the blockchain
include proof of stake, in which the verifiers invest in and hang on to some store of value on
the network; proof of activity, in which proof of work and proof of stake are combined; and
proof of storage, which requires the verifiers to allocate and share disk space in a distributed
cloud. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31. All of these methods are designed to
ensure trust in the accuracy of the distributed ledger system, and prevent fraud by the
participants or outside parties, without requiring a trusted third-party intermediary to
administer the ledger. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 31.
31. Fairfield, supra note 5, at 40–41.
32. BOURQUE & TSUI, supra note 11, at 5.
33. BOURQUE & TSUI, supra note 11, at 6–7.
34. Mendelowitz & Brammertz, supra note 14.
35. WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 3, at 39–44.
36. WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 3, at 41.
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digital currencies, possibly using blockchain technology.37 Smart
contracts could be used to monitor collateral posted for transactions, and
facilitate the clearing and settlement of collateral transactions.38
The British bank Barclays has led an effort that envisions
derivatives documentation—such as ISDA master agreements, credit
support annexes, and confirmations—being reconstituted into
automated smart contracts.39 In the Barclays template, smart contracts
would be provided for counterparties to download and use with the
master agreements stored on a centralized distributed ledger.40 The
technology behind the Barclays initiative has now been released as open
source to encourage innovation and interoperability in the financial
industry’s development of blockchain technology.41 Several large
banks, including JP Morgan and Credit Suisse, recently completed a
successful test of a smart contract prototype for equity swaps, which
included complex post-trade services such as margin payment transfers
and corporate action processing.42 The French bank BNP Paribas is also
exploring automating legal contracts.43
Smart contracts have been suggested for consumer transactions
as well.44 Potentially, consumers could benefit from more parity in
bargaining power with corporations in negotiating business terms for
online transactions.45 In this scenario, consumers may be able to use
automated purchasing agents to negotiate online transactions with

37. E.g., Richard Milne, Sweden’s Riksbank Eyes Digital Currency, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2016) (noting that Sweden’s central bank is debating issuing digital currency).
38. WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 3, at 44.
39. Pete Rizzo, How Barclays Used R3’s Tech to Build a Smart Contracts Prototype,
COINDESK (Apr. 26, 2016, 9:27 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/barclays-smart-contractstemplates-demo-r3-corda/.
40. Id.
41. Tanaya Macheel, R3 Makes Code for Financial Agreements Platform Open Source,
AM. BANKER (Nov. 30, 2016). As an aside, several large banks supporting this blockchain
initiative, including Goldman Sachs and Santander, have announced they are withdrawing
from the alliance of large banks supporting its development. Tanaya Macheel, Another
Bank (Santander) Quits Blockchain Alliance R3, AM. BANKER (Nov. 22, 2016).
42. Michael del Castillo, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse Among 8 in Latest Bank
Blockchain Test, COINDESK (Oct. 18, 2016, 4:28 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/jpmorgan-credit-suisse-among-8-in-latest-bank-blockchain-test.
43. Jean-Pierre Buntinx, BNP Paribas Sees Smart-Contracts in the Future of Legal
Code, BITCOIN.COM (Mar. 29, 2016), https://news.bitcoin.com/bnp-paribas-smart-contractslegal-code/.
44. Fairfield, supra note 5, at 39.
45. Fairfield, supra note 5, at 41.
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vendors, which also may be using automated agents of their own.46
This could create an online world in which the smart contracts negotiate
with each other. Other potential consumer uses of smart contracts
include automatically enforcing car payments or gaining immediate
access to rental housing units.47
The perceived benefits of smart contracts include increased
speed and accuracy of business transactions, more efficient business
operations, and better, quicker, and cheaper enforcement of contracts.48
Financial institutions are expected to spend over $1 billion on
blockchain projects in 2017, making it one of the fastest developing
enterprise software markets.49 This is on top of the $1.4 billion invested
so far over the last three years.50 Most global banks expect to roll out
blockchain technology in 2017.51 However, analysts have suggested
that many of the potential uses for blockchain technology and smart
contracts are very complex and potentially expensive.52 The initial uses
of blockchain technology are expected to be internal and involve
transfer of data rather than payments. These initial uses are unlikely to
deliver the full benefits of blockchain technology, which will only be
achieved when there is a large-scale adoption of common platforms—or
at least platforms capable of communicating with each other—across
the financial services industry.53 At this point, the cost-benefit equation
and future scope of technological adoption has not been fully settled or

Fairfield, supra note 5, at 39.
Judith Lee et al., Blockchain Technology and Legal Implications of ‘Crypto 2.0’,
104 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 654, at 4 (Mar. 31, 2015).
48. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 103 (relating to better contractual
enforcement); Morgan H. McKenney, The Opportunities, Implications and Challenges of
Blockchain in Financial Services, CITIGROUP (June 21, 2016), https://www.citibank.com/tts/
corporations/online_academy/docs/blockchain.pdf (identifying potential financial impacts).
49. Blockchain in Banking: Disruptive Threat or Tool?, MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL
INSIGHT 5 (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Morgan-Stanleyblockchain-report.pdf.
50. Richard Lumb, Downside of Bitcoin: A Ledger that Can’t be Corrected, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/business/
dealbook/downside-of-virtual-currencies-a-ledger-that-cant-be-corrected.html?_r=0.
51. Paul Schaus, Blockchain Projects Will Pay Off—10 Years from Now, AM. BANKER
(Dec. 2, 2016).
52. Id.
53. Id. One report forecasts that the banking industry could save $20 billion per year
by eliminating central authorities and clearing mechanisms and adopting peer-to-peer
blockchain technology instead. Id.
46.
47.
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identified.54 Some commentators have claimed, in fact, that the
“blockchain hype” may have already peaked due to the difficulty of
integrating the technology into the security and trust requirements of
heavily regulated financial institutions.55
While the benefits would certainly be welcome, there are
significant potential drawbacks to smart contracts as well. One of the
biggest questions surrounding smart contracts is cybersecurity. Can
these automated contracts be hacked and manipulated for improper
ends? Further, without mechanisms to amend and enforce them, can
they really substitute for traditional paper agreements?56 Unfortunately,
one recent episode does not bode well in this regard.
In July 2016, in an inside job, a hacker exploited code
vulnerabilities in the so-called Decentralized Autonomous Organization
(“DAO”) to redirect $50 million into the hacker’s own account.57 The
DAO was an investment fund designed to run automatically, without
management or a board, utilizing the Ethereum platform, which
develops and deploys smart contracts.58 Notably, the hacker was not an
unknown outsider, but a participant in the enterprise.59 The hack was
corrected and the funds recovered, but only after a subsequent code

54. Id. The initial benefits from internal adoption of blockchain technology may be
limited to indirect benefits, such as higher customer satisfaction or more accurate reporting.
Id.
55. Phillip Stafford & Hannah Murphy, Has the Blockchain Hype Finally Peaked?,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016) (arguing that the true future of blockchain technology may lie in
initiatives developed by consortia of large financial institutions working together in private
blockchain networks due to cost and security needs).
56. See Larry D. Wall, “Smart Contracts” in a Complex World, FED. RES. BANK OF
ATL. (July 2016), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/
1607.aspx (discussing potential impacts of coding errors).
57. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 2. One commentator has pointed out that some
participants and observers do not consider this situation to be a “hack” at all, but rather the
enforceable implementation of the terms of the smart contract. Matt Levine, Blockchain
Company’s Smart Contracts Were Dumb, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 17, 2016). In this view,
the terms of the smart contract are the code itself, and to the extent that a participant in the
platform makes the code operate in a specified way, then that operation within the code
becomes the enforceable terms of the smart contract. Id. Ex ante descriptions in natural
language of how the code is expected to operate, nor ex post examination of the intent of the
parties, is relevant in this context with respect to the terms of the smart contract, nor should
they be enforceable on the parties to the smart contract. Id. Ultimately, this view did not
prevail in the context of the DAO hack, nor should it have, for smart contracts to be viable
tools for business in a wider context. Id.
58. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 2.
59. See Levine, supra note 57 (noting that the smart contract code allowed the hack to
occur).
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change that was controversial among some participants in the DAO
because it seemed to undermine the immutable characteristic of the
blockchain and smart contract technology.60 As one commentator
noted, “[e]ven the smartest contracts can be susceptible to human
error . . . .”61
IV. LEGAL ISSUES
A.

Contract Law

One initial question regarding smart contracts is whether they
are really contracts. A contract is a legally enforceable promise or
promises.62 To be legally enforceable, the contract must meet a number
of conditions imposed by law, such as multiple parties,63 the capacity of
the parties,64 mutual assent,65 and consideration.66 In addition, there are
number of defenses to the enforcement of contracts, such as mistake,67
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence,68 and unenforceability on
public policy grounds.69 While, in general, a contract may be oral,70
certain contracts must be in tangible form,71 and as a practical matter,
most business-related contracts are in tangible form, whether in a
traditional written document, or in an electronic form, such as electronic
terms and conditions.72
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 2.
Lumb, supra note 50.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. § 9.
Id. § 12.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 17.
Id. § 152.
Id. §177.
Id. § 194.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 110.
The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) requires certain commercial contracts be
in writing, including those for the sale of goods in excess of $500, U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977), liens in personal property, or fixtures not in the
possession of the secured party. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). The UCC defines “written” or
“writing” to include printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible
form. Id. § 1-201(43). The UCC also broadens the concept of tangible form in other
contexts, such as defining a “record” as “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”
Id. § 9-102(70).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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In order to be enforceable, a smart contract would have to meet
all of the traditional requirements of a valid contract. One area that may
be especially tricky for a smart contract is showing “mutual assent” to
the contract. Mutual assent must be manifested by making a promise
and/or rendering performance.73 Manifestation of mutual assent may be
written or spoken,74 but as noted above, some contracts must be in
tangible form. Manifestation of mutual assent is traditionally based on
the concepts of offer and acceptance by the parties to the contract.75
Several recent cases have explored the concepts of contract
formation in the electronic age, but have consistently fallen back on
traditional principles of contract formation, such as manifestation of
mutual assent.76 Contracts entered into on the internet typically fall into
either “clickwrap” or “browsewrap” categories.77 In a clickwrap
agreement, the website user must affirmatively click on a box that he
agrees to the terms, while in a browsewrap agreement, the terms are
posted on the website and do not require affirmative assent from the
user.78 Typically, courts have required a showing of “actual notice” of
the contractual terms.79 Without actual notice of the contractual terms,
the user must be put on inquiry notice of such terms.80 This typically
requires that the terms be conspicuous, and effective notice be given
that continued use of the website will bind the user to the terms.81 The
Ninth Circuit recently held that conspicuous terms alone are not enough
to manifest mutual assent.82
It is clear from this line of cases that an enforceable smart
contract must have a clear record of mutual assent to the terms—such as
clicking on an “agree” button—and it must clearly disclose the terms to
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18.
74. Id. § 19(1).
75. Id. § 22(1).
76. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citations omitted) (noting approvingly that while internet commerce has presented novel
situations, it has not “fundamentally changed the principles of contract,” including
“[m]utual manifestation of assent”).
77. Id. at 1175–76.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1176. Actual notice can include an admission by the user, written
notification of the terms after which the breach persists, or an acknowledgment that the user
is aware of the terms before proceeding on the website. Id.
80. Id. at 1177.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1178–79.
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the contracting parties. Courts have been more likely to uphold
agreements that meet these conditions.83 In a recent case, a court found
manifestation of mutual assent in an online transaction when three
factors were present: (1) a conspicuous notice of the terms of use for an
online transaction, (2) an express warning that proceeding further with
the transaction would bind the party to the terms, and (3) an express
agreement by the user to the terms and conditions at the time of account
creation.84
Commercial law allows a court to deny enforcement to certain
otherwise valid legal agreements based on public policy grounds, such
as unconscionability.85 Review and subsequent non-enforcement of a
smart contract after it is created may be at odds with the immutable
character of blockchain.86 One of the most widely heralded features of
blockchain is its immutability, forming an inviolable record of
transactions. In addition to public policy concerns with a smart contract
transaction, mistakes may be made in connection with a transaction that
later need to be reversed by a court or the parties to the agreement.87 It
seems unlikely that large financial institutions, regulators, and
government officials will embrace a technology that cannot be changed
later if necessary.88 One commentator has recommended that smart
contracts preserve the best features of traditional contracts, including
the ability to be renegotiated in the future if necessary.89
Id.
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 834
F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
85. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
86. DAVID MILLS ET AL., DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS,
FED. RESERVE BD., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECH. IN PAYMENTS, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
28–29 (2016), https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.095.
87. See Kadhim Shubber, Banks Find Blockchain Hard to Put into Practice, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/0288caea-7382-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a
(noting immutable characteristics result in errors that cannot be easily reversed).
88. Accenture has announced development of technology that will allow editing of
blockchain transactions. See Martin Arnold, Accenture to Unveil Blockchain Editing
Technique, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f5cd6754-7e83-11e68e50-8ec15fb462f4 (highlighting regulators’ need to quickly correct errors on the
blockchain before using it in securities markets). A system of editing blockchain
transactions has been applauded by financial participants, but others in the blockchain
community have criticized editing technology as antithetical to the blockchain and
symptomatic of large financial entities attempting to expropriate the blockchain for
themselves in contravention of the technology’s original intent. Id.
89. Wall, supra note 56. Wall argues persuasively that traditional legal agreements are
often intentionally written without contemplating every future contingency because it would
83.
84.
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The federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (“E-SIGN Act”) generally prohibits courts from denying
enforcement of electronic signatures and contracts solely on the basis of
their electronic form.90 The E-SIGN Act also requires that certain
conditions be met in electronic transactions, such as consumer
notifications in certain cases,91 and that electronic contracts be held in a
form that is retained and reproducible in readable form.92 Finally, the ESIGN Act also permits states to develop alternative electronic signature
and record laws, such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(“UETA”).93
UETA was the first comprehensive attempt to prepare state law
for the electronic commerce era and provide uniform rules for electronic
commerce transactions.94 UETA is intended to govern electronic
records and signatures relating to transactions not governed by any
article of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), other than Article 2
and 2A.95 UETA also only applies where all parties to the transaction
have agreed to conduct it electronically.96 Consistent with the approach
of courts in applying existing legal principles to electronic transactions,
UETA was not intended to create an entirely new system of legal rules
for the electronic marketplace, but rather to make sure electronic
transactions were fully enforceable on the same terms as non-electronic
transactions.97 UETA is structured to provide a set of rules to apply
existing legal concepts to electronic transactions.98
Section 9 of UETA provides rules of attribution for electronic
signatures in which any evidence that the signature is the act of a person
may be shown, including any security protocol used to verify the

be uneconomic in many cases to do otherwise, and it is more efficient to renegotiate
traditional agreements, or arbitrate or litigate disputes related to such agreements, if highly
uncertain future events do, in fact, occur. Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2015).
91. Id. § 7001(c).
92. Id. § 7001(e).
93. Id. § 7002(a).
94. Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2017).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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signature or assent.99 Section 16 of UETA provides for “transferable
records” as a supplement to the concept of a “note” under Article 3 of
the UCC,100 but requires that such electronic notes be maintained as the
sole and unique token of the obligations and rights embodied in the
note.101 Section 14 of UETA deals with contracts made through
electronic agents, such as computer programs, and provides for the
validity of such electronic agreements.102 This provision of the law may
be especially useful as parties begin to adopt and utilize artificial
intelligence and robotic technology in the negotiation process.103
It seems clear from the adaptation of legal principles to
electronic transactions that smart contracts will not require any special
set of new laws or regulations. Instead, existing legal principles will be
adapted and perhaps modified, either statutorily or judicially, to deal
explicitly with smart contracts and other emerging technologies—albeit
most likely with a substantial lag time between adoption of the
technology and adjustment of the law. In order to be valid, smart
contracts will have to be constructed in such a way as to meet longestablished legal norms for contracting, such as showing clear
manifestation of mutual assent to the contract terms. This could be
done by having the parties click on a button agreeing to the contractual
terms along with a link to those terms in natural language form. The
contractual terms would need to be preserved in a secure environment in
which they could not be altered without further permission of the
parties. Smart contracts would also have to comply with all existing
federal and state law governing electronic transactions, such as UETA
and the E-SIGN Act.
B.

Evidentiary and Enforcement Issues
While smart contracts should be as fully enforceable as

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”) § 9 (1999).
UETA § 16(a) (defining a “transferable record” as an electronic record that would
be a note under [U.C.C. § 3-104(e)] if the electronic record were in writing, and the issuer
has expressly agreed it is a transferable record).
101. Id. §16 cmt. 3; Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2016).
102. UETA § 14.
103. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 5, at 38–39.
99.
100.
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traditional contracts if crafted in conformity with federal and state law,
they may present special challenges in such enforcement, including
evidentiary issues, enforceability of waivers of defenses, and
jurisdictional and choice-of-law questions. The central idea of a smart
contract is that it is self-executing and eliminates the need to resort to
human intervention, so some of these challenges in enforcement may
reduce the prospective benefits of smart contracts. While countless
undisputed transactions utilizing smart contracts are likely to move
forward on the basis of such automatic, electronic enforcement, there
will likely always be the need for human intervention to settle legal
disputes. In those cases, the courts will need to determine the terms of a
smart contract using many of the traditional legal principles described
above and utilized in adjudicating disputes involving electronic
contracts currently.
Smart contracts may pose particular evidentiary issues given
that the contract is written in computer code. This code would need to
be produced in natural language for a court to review as part of a
dispute, since it is unlikely that courts would possess the requisite
expertise to review the code directly. This problem could be handled
prospectively by developing and maintaining an isolated version of the
code translated into natural language when the smart contract goes into
effect, which could be updated as changes to it are made. This should
not be burdensome to developers of this technology in that they will
need to provide a natural language version of the contract to the parties
to obtain mutual consent. Furthermore, additional expertise and
specialization in smart contract technology would be needed to validate
the smart contract in any litigation, including verifying that the security
protocols are sufficient to maintain the code in its agreed upon state.104
Beyond evidentiary questions, external dispute resolution of
smart contracts also poses questions related to the enforceability of
waivers of defenses. It is likely that these aspects of smart contracts
would also be adjudicated through application of existing legal
principles. For instance, waivers would be enforced to the extent—but
no greater than—they would be if embodied in a traditional written
contract. This may pose additional technological challenges to obtain
104. BOURQUE & TSUI, supra note 11, at 11; see also Wall, supra note 56 (suggesting
placing jurisdiction of smart contracts in particular jurisdictions that have developed wellknown expertise in adjudicating disputes).
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and maintain appropriate records of such waivers, consents, and
agreements among all parties to a transaction. Consumer and
commercial contracts are also likely to be reviewed under the same
existing standards as those applicable to paper contracts, unless
legislatures adopt new legal standards applicable to smart contracts,
which seems unlikely in today’s political and regulatory environment.
Finally, there are jurisdictional questions with respect to smart
contracts, because they operate in connection with a distributed ledger,
such as blockchain.105 For instance, where is the distributed ledger
located if a dispute arises? Blockchain also poses questions concerning
the ability to identify the parties to a transaction, to the extent a system
utilizing this technology remains anonymous, which may raise a host of
additional issues related to dispute resolution.106 Going forward, the
operator of the blockchain platform should be identifiable and could
serve as the counterparty in a dispute scenario, but this is not assured
depending upon the financial strength of the operator. The identity of
the operator or counterparty could also serve to establish the appropriate
venue for external dispute resolution.
The operator of the platform may establish a governing law
provision in the terms of use for the platform and all associated smart
contracts at the time the platform is established. The specification of
the governing law and venue for dispute resolution would need to be
clearly disclosed and agreed to by the parties to the smart contracts to be
enforceable. Depending upon the size of the platform, participants may
enter into traditional agreements at the time of establishment of the
platform by agreeing to basic overarching legal provisions, such as
dispute resolution, governing law, and venue. Without express
agreement, many of the evidentiary issues described above, such as the
“location” of the platform and transactions, would also come into play
in establishing governing law and venue. Leaving these issues to be
determined after the contract is entered into would not be desirable for
larger, more sophisticated transactions.

105.
106.

BOURQUE & TSUI, supra note 11, at 13–14.
BOURQUE & TSUI, supra note 11, at 13.
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Financial Crimes Enforcement Challenges

Smart contracts may also present special challenges with regard
to compliance with anti-terrorism laws and money laundering rules.107
These rules typically require participants in financial transactions to
know and verify the identity of counterparties and report “suspicious
activity” to law enforcement108 or prohibit transfers of funds to
proscribed persons.109 Since smart contracts are designed to be selfexecuting without human intervention, users of these smart contracts
may need to build in controls that allow them to comply with these laws
by verifying identities and blocking unlawful transfers and transactions,
including interfaces with other systems that automatically update lists of
prohibited transactions.
D.

Ethical Issues for Lawyers

Smart contracts may present interesting professional
responsibility issues in the future, such as with regard to the
unauthorized practice of law. Legal ethics prohibit lawyers from aiding
in the unauthorized practice of law.110 In many states, lawyers are also
prohibited from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers or forming
partnerships with non-lawyers.111
Beyond the canons of legal ethics, most state laws also prohibit
the unauthorized practice of law.112 The practice of law includes
preparing legal instruments, rendering opinions, and performing legal
services or giving legal advice.113 The law permits attorneys to engage
third parties to assist them in the practice of law, but the attorney is
required to maintain full professional and direct responsibility for the
information and services received.114
107. Trevor I. Kiviatt, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions,
65 DUKE L. J. 569, 589–594 (2015).
108. Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act,
31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2015) (declaration of purpose); Due Diligence Requirements, 31 C.F.R.
§§ 1010.220, 1020.600 (2016).
109. 31 C.F.R. § 501 (2016).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
111. Id. r. 5.4.
112. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-4, 84-5 (2016); O.C.G.A. § 15-19-51 (2016).
113. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1; O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50.
114. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3; O.C.G.A. § 15-19-54.
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These provisions provide a potential challenge when
implementing smart contract technology in which the contract is in the
form of computer code and that code is deemed to be the legal contract.
An attorney on these projects will need to work closely with computer
specialists to ensure that the code accurately embodies the natural
language legal terms and agreements. While this work can draw on
much of the work in the online electronic marketplace space, such as
drafting legal terms and conditions, many smart contracts are
envisioned between sophisticated parties, such as large banks and other
financial counterparties, and may be bespoke, heavily negotiated
transactions. Both sides will be represented by counsel and that counsel
will need to understand the technology behind the smart contract
process. Finally, the lawyer will need to verify that the contract terms
are embodied in the computer code and will remain secure and
unaltered during the term of the agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology and smart contracts have the potential to
transform financial markets and the business of banking. At this point,
however, this technology is still developing and has not been widely
tested in a regulated environment, which leaves open the possibility of
unknown operational flaws and vulnerabilities. It is still too early to tell
how widely this technology will be adopted and the scope of potential
uses.
Assuming the technology is widely adopted, smart contracts will
need to meet many of the same legal standards as traditional paper
agreements. Smart contracts will benefit from the legal precedent
established in the electronic marketplace including the acceptance of
electronic signatures and promissory notes. At least
initially,
legislatures and regulators are not likely to enact entirely new statutory
and regulatory schemes to accommodate smart contracts. Far more
likely, public entities, including courts, will fashion new legal rules
from existing constructs and adapt them to the new technology. This
may present some growing pains along the way and could slow the
adoption of blockchain technology and smart contracts, particularly in
highly regulated financial institutions.
Alternatively, it may make sense for state and federal
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governments—and eventually international counterparts—to adopt new
or revised rules specifically applicable to blockchain technology and
smart contracts. These rules would deal specifically with the mechanics
of contract formation, enforceability, jurisdictional issues, and legal
ethics related to smart contracts. However, adoption of new rules
presents a proverbial chicken and the egg issue. It is unlikely that these
rules can be developed adequately until the technology is more fully
completed. However, the developers of the technology need some
degree of certainty around the legal structure when developing the
technology. This conundrum will probably result in legal counsel being
closely involved in the development of this new technology, particularly
as prototypes are developed in new markets. While potentially
inefficient and suboptimal from a development standpoint, it may bode
well for the career prospects of those lawyers who understand and
embrace this new technology.

